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Secularism, Fundamentalism or Catholicism? 
The Religious Composition of the United States to 2043 
 
Religious Demography and Market Share 
Sociologists of religion typically focus on the attractiveness of denominations in the 
religious marketplace. Yet the main source of religious recruits are the children of 
communicants. Considering the religious as a population allows us to analyze them 
demographically. “People enter, exit, and move within religion,” remarks David 
Voas, “just as they are born, will die, and migrate, in life” (Voas 2003: 94). Religious 
beliefs are also powerful determinants of demographic events such as marriage, 
divorce and childbearing (McQuillan 2004; UN 1973). The teachings of most major 
religions regulate partnership, sexuality and fertility and can affect demographic 
patterns both explicitly – as with religious leaders‟ injunctions against contraceptives 
and promotion of early marriages, which is related to higher fertility outcomes – and 
indirectly (e.g., socialization into a group where there is strong emphasis on 
childbearing). 
Important differences can also be found between and within major religions. 
Among white Christian Americans, Catholics once had a significant fertility 
advantage over Protestants, but this waned in the second half of the 20th century 
(Jones and Westoff 1979; Sander 1992). On the other hand, evangelical Protestants 
continue to have higher fertility rates than those from more liberal Protestant sects 
(Roof and McKinney 1989; Lehrer 1996; Hout, Greeley and Wilde 2001). The same 
is true for Mormons (Sherkat 2001). By contrast, American Jews have been found to 
have lower fertility than other ethnoreligious groups (Mosher and Hendershot 1984). 
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One reason for this is the later onset of childbearing for Jews and their higher 
investment in human capital accumulation. Lehrer‟s work with the 1995 National 
Survey of Family Growth (NSFG), for instance, finds that the probability of marriage 
by age 20 is 2 percent for Jews, 9 percent for mainline protestants and 17 percent for 
fundamentalist Protestants and Mormons (Thornton, Axinn and Hill 1992; Lehrer 
2004).  
No discussion of religious demography could be complete without discussing 
migration. Immigration is a demographic engine of religious change, and tends to 
increase the religious diversity of a country and challenge dominant denominations. In 
the US, immigration from largely Catholic Latin America – notably Mexico – helped 
to mask net defections from Catholicism to Protestantism and secular nonaffiliation 
(Sherkat 2001). The younger age structure and higher fertility of Latino Catholic 
immigrants to the United States as compared to Protestants has endowed Catholicism 
with an additional demographic tool with which to combat its relative disadvantage in 
the American religious marketplace. As we shall see, both fertility and immigration 
will play a significant role in the recasting of America‟s religious composition in the 
21st century. Our work seeks to build on previous work on religious market dynamics 
and religious demography, in particular the seminal work of Hout, Greeley and Wilde 
(2001) and Sherkat (2001). 
 
Projections of Religious Composition 
The US Census Bureau (USCB) carries out regular projections of the American 
population by race to 2050, greatly advancing our knowledge of impending social 
changes. Far from speculations, these provide solid portrayals of the future which 
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have largely been borne out by subsequent developments, though the 'majority 
minority' point has been revised forward from 2050 to 2042. Projections are only 
partly susceptible to change from shifting fertility and migration parameters. The 
characteristics of the average American of 2050, for instance, can be largely read off 
the youngest American cohorts of today. For this reason, demographic projections 
provide the most accurate predictions in the social sciences.  
The absence of a census question on religious affiliation prevents the USCB 
from making religious projections. Even so, the availability of quality longitudinal 
survey data in the form of the General Social Survey (GSS, Davis et al. 2007) renders 
such a study feasible. Nonetheless, no projection of America‟s religious composition 
utilizing the cohort-component approach has, to our knowledge, been carried out. The 
oft-cited World Christian Encyclopedia (WCE) extrapolates the size of religious 
groups (including seculars) from baptismal data, but does not account for the 
demographic variables of age structure, fertility and immigration, nor the sociological 
dynamics of religious switching (Barrett, Kurian and Johnson 2001). 
Religious projections using our method have recently been carried out for 
several other countries. Goujon, Skirbekk and Fliegenschnee (2007) present census-
based religious projections for Austria and Switzerland
1
 and find the Christian share 
to be shrinking in both. The Swiss were more than 95 percent Christian in 1970, but 
this figure sank to 75 percent in 2000 and will fall to between 42 and 63 percent by 
2050. In Austria, the long dominant Roman Catholics decreased to 75 percent in 2001 
and are expected to comprise less than half the population by mid-century. In both 
cases, Christian decline is mainly related to secularization, but is also linked to the 
growth of non-Christian religions, notably Islam. Statistics Canada (2005) has carried 
out projections of the religious composition of Canada which accounts for fertility and 
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mortality differentials as well as rates of intergenerational religious transmission. But 
these do not take religious conversion into consideration and only cover the period to 
2017, too short a span to capture most demographic effects. 
We project the size of America‟s main ethnoreligious groupings to 2043, 
taking into account the impact of religion on fertility and the way immigration affects 
religious composition. We also account for conversion and secularization by age and 
sex as well as the intergenerational transmission of religious affiliation. We find that 
the US in 2043 will remain majority Christian, but with a different ethnoreligious 
composition. Hence the share of Hispanic Catholics, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists and 
seculars increases, while the mainly „white‟ religious groups – Liberal, Moderate and 
Fundamentalist Protestants as well as non-Hispanic Catholics – experience 
proportional decline. Smith and Kim (2004) recently found that the Protestant share of 
the American population fell below 50 percent. We envisage a further decline in the 
Protestant total, notwithstanding Protestant gains from Catholic switching. 
 
Data 
This research relies on a cross-pollination of census and survey data. The principal 
data source is the GSS. It has been conducted annually from 1972-93 with an 
interview sample of around 1500 and biennially from 1994 with a sample of 2800.
2
 It 
asks respondents about their current religious denomination as well as their 
denomination at age 16, enabling a measure of religious conversion. It has been used 
extensively by scholars who have examined longer-term trends in the American 
religious marketplace. (i.e., Sherkat 2001; Hout, Greeley and Wilde 2001) The GSS 
classifies largely white (non-African American) Protestant denominations as 
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„fundamentalist‟, „moderate‟ or „liberal‟ according to a schema developed by Smith 
(1986). It also aggregates denominations into larger religious affiliation categories 
such as Protestant, Catholic or Other non-Christian. In all cases, we adopt the 
classifications used by the GSS. This yields eleven major ethnoreligious groups for 
analysis: Fundamentalist Protestants excluding Blacks (PFU), Moderate Protestants 
excluding Blacks (PMO), Liberal Protestants excluding Blacks (PLI), Black 
Protestants (PBL), non-Hispanic Catholics (CAT), Hispanic Catholics (CHI), Jews 
(JEW), Hindus and Buddhists (HBU), Muslims (MUS), Other Religions (OTH) and 
No religion (NOR). Note that the non-Hispanic Catholics, non-black Protestants and 
No religion groups are overwhelmingly white but not exclusively so. For instance, 
there are important numbers of Hispanic Protestants and black Catholics. Similarly, 
the small Asian-American population contains Protestants, Catholics and those of No 
religion as well as the more obvious Hindus, Buddhists, Muslims and Others. 
 Of course, Muslim, Buddhist/Hindu and Other Religions are extremely small 
categories (i.e., 1 percent or less), and can be undercounted by the GSS, so we rely 
upon a set of recent Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life surveys which provide 
precise estimates of their size (Pew 2008; Pew 2007). The GSS also likely 
undercounts African-Americans and Hispanics, so we weight our data to reflect these 
groups' share of the US census. The PSU (Primary Sampling Units) that the GSS uses 
at different points in time can also affect the size and characteristics of certain groups. 
To ensure that the GSS data is fairly representative we compare its findings to 
alternative surveys which have been conducted since the year 2000 (Table 1). In 
general, although the estimates differ, the various surveys present a broadly consistent 
picture, with about half the population Protestant, a quarter Catholic and about one in 
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eight without religion, with a scattering of smaller groups (Jews, Hindus, Muslims 
and other religious groups). 
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Table 1. Religion data by GSS compared with alternative data sources (age 18+) 
in percent 
  Adjusted 
GSS 
2000-
2006, 
N=12674, 
 
PEW (2008), 
N=3002, 
Muslim 
Population: 
PEW 2007, 
N=1050 
 
ARIS 
(2001) 
Census, N= 
50281 
Baylor 
Religion 
Survey 
(2005) 
(collected 
by 
Gallup), 
N=1721 
Black Protestants 9.8 57   
(includes 9 
unspecified 
“Christians”) 
52.5 
(all non 
Catholic 
Christians)  
5 
Fundamentalist Protestant 19.5 33.6  
Moderate Protestant 8.9 22.1  
Liberal Protestant 8.8 
Catholic non-Hispanic 18.7 23  24.5 21.2 
Hispanic Catholic 9.6 
Jewish 1.5 2  1.3 2.5 
Hindu-Buddhist 1.1 1  0.9   
Muslim 0.5 0.6  0.5 0.2 
Other 4.6  2    4.9 
No religious affiliation 17 14 13.2 10.8 
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The above is reflected in our starting year (2003) data for the population by age, sex 
and religious affiliation, drawn from the GSS for the years 2000-2006. These years 
were pooled together in order to increase sample size for the base population 
(N=12674) and they are the only available survey years that include both minority 
religions (notably Hinduism and Islam) and a separate Hispanic category. Figure 1 
shows the ethnoreligious composition of our base population in 2003, the starting year 
of our projection. 
Figure 1: Share of the 2003 population by religious affiliation  
Protestant 
Fundamentalist
19.5%
Catholic non-
Hispanic
18.7%
Catholic Hispanic
9.6%
No Religion
17.0%
Protestant Black
9.8%
Muslim
0.5%
Other
4.6%
Hindu/Buddhist 
1.1%
Protestant 
Moderate
8.9%
Protestant Liberal
8.8%
Jewish
1.5%
   
Sources: GSS 2000-2006 and authors‟ calculations. 
 
Finally, immigration forms a crucial part of the projection, and we introduce 
an annual addition to each religious group, broken down by age band and sex, based 
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on observed immigration. Annual immigration figures come from the Population 
Estimates Program of the US Census Bureau (2007). The religious affiliation of 
immigrants is based on CIA data on source country religious composition (CIA 
2008). We assume immigrants are randomly selected in terms of religion in their 
country of origin, though we accept that there may be instances where immigrants are 
unrepresentative of their homeland's religious composition. Immigrant age structure is 
derived from a standard schedule (Rogers and Castro 1981). 
 
Methodology 
The aforementioned sources provide us with information regarding base population, 
age structure, fertility, conversion behaviour and immigration. These provide the 
inputs we need to undertake population projections. For the US, the significant 
longitudinal component of the GSS (1972-2006) allows us to observe a time series 
run of conversion and fertility behaviour analogous to annual immigration statistics. 
These are scenario-based multi-state cohort component projections, carried out with 
the use of PDE projection software,
3
 a multi-state population projection program. We 
use initial population by age, sex and ethnoreligious denomination, age- and religion-
specific fertility rates, age- and sex-specific mortality rates, and age-, sex- and 
religion-specific net migration numbers. In addition, a central input into any multi-
state projection is the religious conversion rate, such as the secularizing trend from 
Christianity to No Religion, or conversion from Catholicism to Fundamentalist 
Protestantism. Questions are asked about denominational affiliation at age 16, which 
we cross-tabulate with current denominational affiliation to produce an estimate of 
conversion flows by sex and age band. We employ both expected and alternate 
scenarios based on varying fertility, conversion and immigration assumptions. 
 10 
 
Projection Parameters 
Base-year fertility 
Fertility differences by religion in the USA were estimated from GSS data on children 
ever born to women aged 40 to 59
4
 for the period 2000-2006. The differentials were 
then proportionally adjusted and applied to the TFR reported for 2003 by the US 
Census Bureau. The data was not sufficient to estimate the age specific schedules of 
fertility rates. Hence all religious groups follow the age specific fertility schedule as 
observed at the national level. The estimated religious fertility differentials are given 
in Table 2
5
. Hispanic Catholics and Muslims have the highest fertility (2.8 children 
per woman), while Jews have the lowest with 1.4 children. Among Protestants, Black 
Protestant fertility is highest, at 2.4 children per woman. The two largest „white‟ 
religious categories, non-Hispanic Catholics and Fundamentalist Protestants, have 
close to replacement fertility (2.1 children) while others and the „No Religion‟ groups 
have much lower TFRs of around 1.65 children per woman, with Jews lowest at 1.43. 
The relatively low fertility of Hindus and Buddhists may be attributable to very 
selective migration from India and the Far East.
6
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Table 2: TFR (Total Fertility Rate) by religion, 2003 
Religion TFR 
Muslims (MUS) 2.84 
Hispanic Catholics (CHI) 2.75 
Black Protestants (PBL) 2.35 
Fundamentalist Protestants excluding Blacks (PFU) 2.13 
Non-Hispanic Catholics (CAT) 2.11 
Moderate Protestants excluding Blacks (PMO) 2.01 
Liberal Protestants excluding Blacks (PLI) 1.84 
Hindus/Buddhists (HBU) 1.73 
No religion (NOR) 1.66 
Others (OTH) 1.64 
Jews (JEW) 1.43 
     U.S. Population Average 2.08 
Sources: Authors‟ calculations based on GSS 2000-2006 and USCB 
 
Base-year mortality 
Mortality cannot be estimated for each religious group, so we assume a single value 
for each age group and sex following the estimates of the National Center for Health 
Statistics (NCHS), available in Kung et al. (2008). While we acknowledge that 
mortality differences could have a minor effect on religious composition in 2043, this 
does not affect fertility, migration or the number of women of various denominations 
in their childbearing years. 
Base-year migration 
 
The number of immigrants since the 1980s has reached levels unseen since the 
immigration peak of the early 20th century. Immigration is therefore a key factor in 
the changing religious landscape of the United States. Yet there are two major 
difficulties in estimating immigration differentials by religion. One is inherent to the 
immigration process in the United States where illegal flows from across the Mexican 
border play an important role. We do not take illegal immigration into account, 
though a substantial share of legal immigration consists of formerly undocumented 
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immigrants who have been granted amnesty. The second difficulty has to do with the 
lack of data on the faith of immigrants. We obtained the differentials in the religious 
affiliation of the immigrants from the starting year (2003) as follows. First, we 
retrieved the number of persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by region 
between 2003 and 2006 (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2007). We selected 
the countries of birth of most persons acquiring legal permanent status (all above 
5,000 persons per year during the 2003-2006 period).
7
 Next, we obtained the shares of 
the population by religion from the CIA World Factbook (CIA 2007). Some 
adjustments were made to fit the CIA data to our specific categories. We treat Latin 
American Protestants and East Asian Protestants as 90 percent Fundamentalists, 5 
percent Moderates and 5 percent Liberals. We treat European Protestants as 50 
percent Moderate and 50 percent Liberals. For Canadians, Protestants are divided 
equally between Fundamentalists, Moderates and Liberals, reflecting the intermediate 
position of Canadian Protestantism between British and American denominational 
traditions. These rates were then applied to the number of persons obtaining legal 
permanent resident status for the main countries of birth between 2003 and 2006 and 
aggregated by the 11 religious categories reported in Figure 2. Those shares were then 
applied to the net number of immigrants for the period 2000-2005 and distributed by 
age and sex (according to model age schedules of migration). 
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Figure 2: Share of the 2003-2006 immigrants by religious affiliation 
Jewish
0.01%
Protestant Liberal
0.7%
Protestant 
Moderate
0.7%
Hindu/Buddhist 
9.6%
Other
12.9%
Muslim
8.4%
Protestant Black
0.8%
No Religion
16.8%
Catholic Hispanic
34.8%
Catholic non-
hispanic
10.3%
Protestant 
Fundamentalist
5%
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2007) and CIA (2007) 
 
Base-year transitions 
Transition rates reflect conversion flows between religions. We based our 
estimate of transition probabilities between religions (110 possible flows between the 
11 religious categories) on comparing religion retrospectively reported for age 16 
with current religion. Since the GSS does not provide the age at which the switch to 
another religion occurred, we distributed the transitions equally across three age 
groups: 15-19, 20-24, 25-29. This is in line with switching patterns observed in other 
countries (Goujon, Skirbekk and Fliegenschnee 2007). We further assume that men 
are 6 percent more likely to switch out of their own religion than women. This is 
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based on gender differences among apostates: the proportion who were members of a 
religion at age 16 but now report being nonreligious. Moreover, women who were 
religiously unaffiliated at age 16 are 29 percent more likely to adopt a religion than 
men from the same (secular) background.  
Table 3 shows the transition probabilities observed. For example, 15.1 percent 
of those without religion at age 16 became Fundamentalist Protestants as adults and 
11.7 percent of those raised Fundamentalist Protestant transited the other way. Note 
the substantial losses to secularism (NOR) across all religions, the relative retentive 
power of the more „ethnic‟ Jewish, Black, Hispanic and Muslim groups and the 
comparative deficit of mainline Protestants (PMO, PLI) and white Catholics (CAT) in 
exchanges with Fundamentalist Protestants (PFU). This confirms existing scholarship 
pertaining to religious marketplace trends, as well as insights from the „strict church‟ 
hypothesis (Iannaccone 1994; Sherkat 2001; Hout, Greeley and Wilde 2001). 
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Table 3: Matrix of Total Transition Probabilities: Religion at age 16 versus 
Current Religion 
     To: 
From: 
PFU PMO PLI PBL CAT CHI JEW HBU MUS OTH NOR Total 
PFU 67.3 7.7 7.1 0.0 2.7 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 2.9 11.7 100 
PMO 9.9 57.8 9.2 0.0 2.6 0.1 0.1 0.9 0.0 4.4 14.9 100 
PLI 11.0 7.0 58.9 0.0 4.6 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.0 2.9 15.1 100 
PBL 0.0 0.0 0.0 87.1 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 3.2 7.5 100 
CAT 4.4 3.5 3.2 1.2 71.2 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.0 4.0 11.9 100 
CHI 5.6 1.1 0.9 0.0 0.0 81.7 0.1 0.6 0.0 2.6 7.3 100 
JEW 1.0 1.4 0.8 0.0 0.8 0.0 80.5 1.1 0.0 0.5 13.8 100 
HBU 3.3 7.1 1.3 0.5 5.7 0.0 1.3 55.4 2.4 3.3 19.7 100 
MUS 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 71.4 7.1 13.3 100 
OTH 8.3 14.0 1.6 4.6 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.4 47.1 19.1 100 
NOR 15.1 8.3 6.2 2.0 5.8 0.2 1.5 1.1 0.3 3.6 55.9 100 
Net 
Flow -3.3 10.3 -2.0 -5.3 -15.9 
-
17.6 0.8 11.5 4.6 25.4 24.7 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on GSS 2000-2006 
 
Retrospective Tests 
In order to validate the methodology used for the projections, we applied it to 
historical GSS data to see if we could fit our model to observed data. This was 
performed for the five main religious categories that were found across all years for 
which GSS data are available. Simulations using a six year moving average are 
deployed to produce data from 1975 to 2000. The fertility differentials between 
religions as well as the religious composition of the immigration flow are based upon 
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those observed in the base-year of our projection. However we make some 
adjustments for historical data. Assumptions for total fertility (estimated at 1.81 for 
1975-1980), mortality and migration (350,000 per annum during 1975-1980) follow 
the historical data available from the US Census Bureau (for fertility and mortality) 
and from the UN (2006 - for migration). Transition probabilities were calculated in 
the same way as mentioned in the previous section, based on comparing religion 
retrospectively reported for age 16 with current religion for two periods: 1972-1978 
and 1992-1998. The results are shown in Figure 3. Our model performs quite well 
against observed data, projecting the trend toward a relatively less Protestant and 
more secular nation. It also shows that GSS data fluctuates significantly around the 
trend, reflecting period and sampling effects.  
 
Figure 3: Observed and modelled proportion by 5 main religious categories  
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004
Years
Protestants (observed)
Protestants (model)
Catholics (observed)
Catholics (model)
Jews (observed)
Jews (model)
Others (observed)
Others (model)
No religion (observed)
No religion (model)
 
Sources: GSS 1972-2006 and authors’ calculations 
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Scenarios 
In addition to our expected scenario (H0) based on current trends, four alternative 
scenarios were developed; they diverge by the net number of immigrants, the fertility 
rates of the 11 religious categories and the conversion rates between religions. Table 4 
summarizes the assumptions made in the five scenarios for our 2003-2043 
projections.
8
 
 Table 4: Scenarios matrix 
  Migration 
  Conversion  Constant Doubles Zero 
Constant Fertility 
Differentials 
Constant H0 H1 H3 
Zero H2    
Converging Fertility 
Differentials 
Constant      
Zero     H4 
 
We consider two alternative fertility assumptions, constant and converging. Constant 
fertility (scenarios H0, H1, H2) holds fertility within each religion constant at the 
level observed in the base year, 2003 (see Table 2), consistent with the US Census 
Bureau‟s constant ethnic fertility differences (Day 1996). Note that the overall 
American TFR changes as a result of religious compositional effects. Thus the 
constant fertility assumption raises the aggregate American TFR from 2.08 in 2003 to 
2.2 in 2043 as high fertility Latino Catholics increase their share of the total. 
Converging fertility (scenario H3) assumes that fertility by religion converges to a 
TFR of 2.1 children by 2033-2038, and remains constant thereafter. This TFR is 
slightly lower than the medium variant of the US population projection which 
envisions this figure increasing to 2.19 in 2050 (U.S. Census Bureau 2004) We further 
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assume that children have the same religion as their mothers, regardless of the type of 
union, mono-religious or mixed. This is a problematic assumption in Europe, where 
mixed unions often lead to secularism, but not in the American case. 
With respect to immigration, there are three possible pathways. Constant 
migration (scenario H0) involves the net number of immigrants to the US remaining 
constant at 1.2 million per year until the end of the projection period (value from UN 
2006 for 2005-2010). Double migration (scenario H1) assumes that net immigration 
doubles from the start, resulting in an annual influx of 2.4 million per annum between 
2003 and 2043. The current congressional debate over immigration reform may lead 
to legislation which reduces the number of immigrants entering the country. 
Accordingly, the zero migration scenarios (H3, H4), gauge the impact of immigration 
against other drivers of projection outcomes. In all immigration scenarios, the share of 
immigrants by religious denomination stays constant at the levels estimated for the 
starting period 
 As regards conversion between religions, there are two options. The first is a 
constant conversion assumption which fixes adult switching probabilities at the levels 
observed during 2000-2006 with children inheriting the religious category of their 
mothers and summarized in Table 3. The second is zero conversion, which assumes 
no adult religious switching between groups over the life course. 
 
Results 
Our five scenarios produce significantly different total fertility rates for the American 
population. We expect an upward trend in fertility over the projection period as more 
fertile religions expand. The national TFR varies significantly – between 2.10 and 
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2.16 – due to changes in the religious composition of the population. US population 
size is first and foremost affected by immigration (Figure 4). If immigration remains 
constant, the population size reaches 420 million in 2043. Notice that this is in line 
with official projections for 2043 from the USCB and Social Security 
Administration.
9
 If immigration doubles, we project a US population of 495 million 
while zero immigration results in a population of 342 million, 78 million less than in 
the constant immigration scenario. Immigration also affects the population size 
through its effect on fertility levels since the religious composition of the immigrants 
differs from that of the resident population. This is mainly due to the increase in the 
proportion of high fertility Hispanic Catholics in the population. Conversion likewise 
affects population size partly because Hispanic Catholics convert to lower fertility 
secular or Protestant groups – hence in the absence of secularization and conversion 
(H2), there will be 2 million more Americans in 2043 than under our constant 
conversion (H0) scenario which fixes secularization and conversion rates at base year 
levels. 
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Figure 4: Total population, United States of America, 5 scenarios and projection 
results from Social Security Administration and Census Bureau, 2003-2043 
 
280
330
380
430
480
2003 2013 2023 2033 2043
Constant (H0)
Migration doubles
(H1)
No conversion (H2)
No migration (H3)
No migration, no
conversion, fertility
convergence (H4)         
Social Security
Administration
US Census Bureau
 
Source: Authors’ calculations; US Census Bureau (UCSB), Social Security Administration (SSA)  
 
Figure 5 shows the projected trend for five meta-religious groups. Under all 
scenarios, Protestants, Catholics, those from Other religions and the nonreligious are 
expected to grow in absolute terms, while the Jews, due to low immigration and low 
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fertility, are expected to decline slightly. In terms of the religious composition of the 
American population in 2043, the constant (immigration, fertility, conversion) 
scenario (H0) projects that Protestants will decrease from 47 to 39 percent as 
Catholics rise from 28 to 32 percent. Those of Other religions will almost double, 
from 6 to 11 percent, the unaffiliated „secular‟ population increases slightly from 16 
to 17 percent while the Jews decline but remain above 1 percent of the population.  
The difference between H0 (constant conversion rates) and H2 (no 
conversion) shows that today‟s conversion trends mainly benefit the Protestant and 
Secular groups. Religious conversion reduces the number of Catholics (relative to no 
conversion) by 15.5 million and those from Other religions by 2 million. Conversely, 
seculars increase by 3 million through conversion and Protestants by 12.5 million. If 
fertility differentials and immigration remain at today‟s levels, but there is no 
religious conversion (H3), the Catholic population would exceed that of Protestants – 
a symbolic moment in American history! Even under our constant assumption (H0), 
Catholics in the youngest age cohorts will outnumber their Protestant counterparts by 
2043 and take over some time in the second half of the 21st century. This would 
principally be due to higher Hispanic Catholic fertility and immigration. If 
immigration continues at today‟s pace (H0), there will be 35 million more Catholics 
in 2043 than would have been true without immigration (H3). Protestants, by contrast, 
gain only 9 million adherents through immigration in the same period. Other religions 
gain 20 million and seculars 12 million through immigration. 
We have largely discussed trends in ethnoreligious change, but we know that 
denominations are theologically diverse. (Hoffmann and Miller 1998) In particular, 
the religious restructuring or 'culture wars' perspective highlights the importance of 
trans-denominational processes like secularism or traditionalism. (Guth et al. 2006; 
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Hunter 1991) This theory predicts a continued hollowing out of the religious centre in 
favour of fundamentalism and secularism. However, while seculars do grow as 
projected, we find powerful demographic limits to secularism under the constant (H0) 
scenario. In spite of considerable gains through the secularization (conversion) of 
members from religious groups, the share of the population comprised of secular 
nonaffiliates plateaus before the end of the projection period. In effect, low secular 
fertility is sufficient to reverse the secularization process at the aggregate level! This 
is an extremely important result in that it demonstrates the power of demography to 
reverse secularization even in developed societies. (Kaufmann 2008) This may lead us 
to question the widely shared view that secularization is an inevitable handmaiden of 
the modernization process. 
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Figure 5: Population Size by Religion for Five Religious Categories 
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We now move beneath meta-religious groups in figure 5 to consider the 
relative position of our 11 ethnoreligious categories. Figure 6 sets out our projections 
based on the constant (conversion/immigration/fertility differentials) scenario (H0). 
The most rapid changes take place among Hispanic Catholics, who almost double 
from roughly 10 percent in 2003 to 18 percent in 2043. Along the way, they surpass 
the two largest „white‟ religious groups, Fundamentalist Protestants and Catholics. 
„White‟ (i.e. non-Hispanic) Catholics decline in the same period from 19 to 15 
percent. In addition, all Protestant groups – Fundamentalist, Moderate, Liberal and 
Black – lose market share towards the end of the projection. The secular proportion of 
the population, as noted, peaks in 2033 and declines somewhat towards the end of the 
period as the long-term effects of low secular fertility kick in.  
Nevertheless, we find that the most committed parties in the „culture wars‟ 
that divide America, Fundamentalist Protestants and those without religion, trade 
places over this period. Fundamentalist Protestants, 78 percent of whom supported 
George W. Bush as president in 2004, decline from 19.5 percent to 16.7 percent. 
Those without religion, just 28 percent of whom backed Bush, increase slightly from 
17 to 17.4 percent, surpassing Fundamentalist Protestants in 2033. Hispanic Catholics 
lean Democratic by a 48:20 two-party ratio in the 2003 GSS, thus the increasingly 
secular and Hispanic-Catholic America of 2043 should favour the Democrats in the 
coming decades (Guth et al. 2006). A glimpse of what may transpire comes from 
California, whose trends tend to foreshadow those of the nation as a whole. During 
1980-2003, rapid ethno-demographic change transformed the state from white (non-
Hispanic) majority to white minority. Along the way, it changed from a finely-
balanced battleground state into a „natural‟ Democratic one. Demographic change was 
only part of the story, but played a significant role in the process. (Korey and Lascher 
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2006: 58, 61) However, while seculars and Hispanic Catholics are Democrat-leaning, 
the latter are far more conservative in their social attitudes. In this sense, Hispanic 
Catholics resemble white working-class Democrats and reinforce the median 
American political profile which has held since 1954: conservative but Democratic 
(Box-Steffensmeier and De Boef 2001). Though ideology has been coming into 
alignment with partisanship in recent decades as the main parties distinguish 
themselves more clearly along ideological lines (Abramowitz and Saunders 2006), 
Hispanic immigration will work in the opposite direction to maintain dissonance 
between ideology and partisanship. This was demonstrated in 2008 by the passage of 
Proposition 8 (opposing same-sex marriage) in California on the strength of minority 
support. 
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Figure 6: Share of Total Population for 11 Religious Categories (Constant 
(H0) scenario) 
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Source: GSS; Author’s calculations  
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Our projections further indicate that Muslims, Hindus/Buddhists and Other 
non-Christian faiths will increase their share of the population throughout the 
projection period. The balance between Muslims and Jews (Figure 7) is especially 
noteworthy in view of their differing views on American foreign policy. Should 
current immigration and fertility patterns continue, we expect Muslim Americans to 
overtake Jews by 2020 within the population and 2028 within the electorate.
10
 The 
power of the Israel lobby is largely attributed to extra-Jewish forces such as Christian 
Zionism or partially Jewish ones like neoconservatism (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006) 
and also derives from the substantial presence of Jews within the American elite. This 
may insulate it from demographic change. Even so, Muslim America‟s eclipse of 
Jewish America will register in the nation‟s consciousness and could affect America‟s 
foreign policy calculus. 
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Figure 7. Proportion of Jews and Muslims in the American Population and 
Electorate (Constant (H0) Scenario)  
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Jewish, age 20+
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Source: GSS; Author’s calculations 
 
Whites are disproportionately represented in the American electorate, media 
and power structure. They thereby merit closer scrutiny. Figure 8 shows trends within 
the white (non-Hispanic) population. We begin by noting the relative strength of 
Liberal Protestants and seculars within the white, as compared to the total, population. 
Whites are affected least by immigration but most by secularization. During the 
projection period, seculars increase their share of the white population substantially. 
Moderate and Fundamentalist Protestants retain their positions, while Jews, Catholics 
and Liberal Protestants decline. These trends owe something to the religious 
restructuring which is polarising Liberal Protestants and white Catholics toward 
secularism and fundamentalism. Low Jewish and Liberal Protestant fertility also 
account for some of the trend. We may surmise that these patterns will enhance the 
secular tint of the American white elite and may deepen the divisions between 
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religion and secularism which characterize the so-called „culture wars‟ (Hunter 1991; 
Fiorina, Abrams and Pope 2005). Curiously, relaxed immigration, a liberal cause 
celèbre, actually works to curb secularizing tendencies in the population at large. 
 
Figure 8: Religious Composition of the ‘White’ Population, 2003-2043 (constant 
(H0) scenario)  
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Conclusion 
The US Census Bureau has, for some time, published projections of the racial 
composition of the American population to 2050 which show that a majority of 
Americans will be non-„white‟ by 2050.11 This so-called „browning of America‟ has 
entered the public lexicon, but we have no similar awareness of what is happening 
with religion because of the lack of a census question on the subject. This study 
provides the first ever cohort-component projection of the main religious groups in 
the United States. Largely based on the General Social Survey, census immigration 
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statistics and Pew small religious group data, it projects the size of eleven American 
religious groups to 2043. Though our projections, like those of the Census Bureau, 
depend on immigration and fertility assumptions which can fluctuate, demographic 
projections are the most certain of any in the social sciences. This is because the 
characteristics of future populations are heavily constrained by the age-structural 
features of the current population.  
We find considerable stability of religious groups over time, but there are 
some important shifts. Hispanic Catholics experience the strongest growth rates to 
2043. Immigration, high fertility and a young age structure will enable this group to 
expand from 10 to 18 percent of the American population between 2003 and 2043, 
despite a net loss of communicants to secularism and Protestantism. This will power 
the growth of Catholics as a whole, who will surpass Protestants by mid-century 
within the nation's youngest age groups. This represents a historic moment for a 
country settled by anti-Catholic Puritans, whose Revolution was motivated in part by 
a desire to spread dissenting Protestantism and whose population on the eve of 
revolution was 98 percent Protestant. (Kaufmann 2004; Huntington 2004) Another 
important development concerns the growth of the Muslim population and decline of 
the Jews. High Muslim fertility and a young Muslim age structure contrasts with low 
Jewish childbearing levels and a mature Jewish age structure. Barring an unforeseen 
shift in the religious composition and size of the immigrant flow, Muslims will 
surpass Jews in the population by 2023 and in the electorate by 2028. This could have 
profound effects on the course of American foreign policy. Within the non-Hispanic 
white population, we expect to see continued Liberal Protestant decline due to low 
fertility and a net loss in exchanges with other groups. White Catholics will also lose 
due to a net outflow of converts. Fundamentalist and Moderate Protestant 
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denominations will hold their own within the white population, but will decline 
overall as the white share of the population falls. 
Our work also sheds light on the religious restructuring paradigm, though we 
do not find a clear victor between secularism and fundamentalism. The secular 
population will grow substantially in the decades ahead because it has a young age 
structure and more people leave religion than enter it. The sharpest gains for 
secularism will be within the white population, where seculars will surpass 
fundamentalists by 2030. On the other hand, there are important demographic limits 
to secularism, demonstrating the power of religious demography. The relatively low 
fertility of secular Americans and the religiosity of the immigrant inflow provide a 
countervailing force which will cause the secularization process within the total 
population to plateau before 2043. This represents an important theoretical point in 
that demography permits society to become more religious even as individuals tend to 
become less religious over time.  
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1
 Haug and Wanner (2000) also projected future religious denominations for Switzerland but only up to 
2020 and exclude those without religion, the fastest growing group. 
2
 The only exceptions are the years 1979, 1981 and 1992 (a supplement was added in 1992). 
3
 The IIASA PDE multi-state population projection software as well as information and instructions 
can be downloaded from: http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/POP/pub/software.html 
4
 For Muslims, we base the differential on the 35 to 59 population to increase sample size. 
5
 Fertility differentials are very close (the average difference is 0.02 child) to those computed by 
Chandra et al. (2005) from the 2002 National Survey of Family Growth. Their classification is based 
on children ever born and total children expected from women aged 15-44 for the following religious 
categories: none, fundamentalist Protestant, other Protestant, Catholic, and other religion 
6
 Due to selective migration and a younger age structure, Indians living in the US have a high education 
level, and higher education tends to be related to lower fertility (Skirbekk 2008). More than 58 percent 
have college degrees (compared to 25 percent of the general US population and 6 percent in India), and 
they also possess higher than average wealth and income levels (Lutz et al. 2007; Kiviat 2005). 
7
 The countries of birth of most persons (82 to 85 percent across the 2003 to 2006 population) 
acquiring legal permanent status is the following: Bangladesh, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, Canada, 
China, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Germany, 
Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Iran, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Mexico, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Taiwan, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukraine, United 
Kingdom, Venezuela, Vietnam. 
8
 As mentioned in the preceding section, mortality is not considered separately for each religious 
category. The life expectancy assumptions to 2043 are interpolated based on assumptions used by the 
US Census Bureau (2004). 
9
 The SSA 2003 estimated population was interpolated by the authors between the values provided by 
SSA for 2000 and 2005. 
10
 Note that there are almost certainly more 'ethnic' Jews than Muslims among those raised with No 
Religion, though secularization rates are similar among adults of both groups. The low Jewish fertility 
rate may also increase as the Orthodox share of the American Jewish total rises. For instance, while 
only 2 percent of secular Jews and 3-5 percent of Reform and Conservative Jews had more than two 
children in their household in 2001, 25 percent of Orthodox Jews did. 33 percent of Jews aged 18-34 
are Orthodox, whereas just 8 percent of Jews over 75 are. (Ament 2005: 16)  
11
 „White‟ here excludes the roughly 50 percent of Hispanics who identify as racially white on the 
census. 
